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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1543 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
    
v. 
 
DEPREME T. SAPP 
a/k/a Dupreme T. Sapp 
 
Depreme T. Sapp, Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-98-cr-00031-001) 
District Judge:  Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 August 22, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR., AND VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 22, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Depreme T. Sapp, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
denying his motion for a sentence reduction.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
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I. 
 In 1998, Sapp pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 
cocaine and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),(b)(1)(A) and 846.  In 
light of his criminal history, he was sentenced as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  As a career offender, Sapp had a criminal history category of VI, 
and after an adjustment based on acceptance of responsibility, he had a total offense level 
of 34, higher than his offense level would have been had it been based on drug quantity.  
Background 
See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) (“if the offense level for a career offender . . . is greater than the 
offense level otherwise applicable, the offense level [for a career offender] shall apply.”).  
The District Court sentenced him to a term of 262 months of imprisonment, within the 
guideline range of 262-to-327 months.  See U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table, Ch. 5, Pt. A.1
 In 2010, Sapp filed a pro se motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  He argued that his sentence should be reduced based on 
    
Spears v. 
United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009), and Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines.2
                                              
 1 In 2008, Sapp filed a pro se motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), asserting that Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines reduced 
his guideline range.  The District Court denied the motion. 
 
  
An Assistant Federal Public Defender was then appointed to determine whether Sapp 
 2 Sapp requested a reduction in sentence based on the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.  
Amendment 750, which took effect on November 1, 2011, re-promulgated as permanent 
a temporary amendment that implemented the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.  See U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, vol. III, Amend. 750. 
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might qualify for a reduction of sentence.  Sapp’s appointed counsel determined, 
however, that Sapp was not eligible for a reduction of sentence and filed a motion to 
withdraw as counsel.  The District Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and 
denied the motion for reduction of sentence.  Sapp timely appealed.  In his brief in 
support of his appeal, Sapp argues that he should be resentenced based on Spears
II. 
 and 
Amendment 750, and he contends that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 is unconstitutional. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court's 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo.  
Discussion 
United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 
152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review a district court's ultimate decision to deny a motion 
pursuant to § 3582(c) for abuse of discretion.  
To be eligible for a reduction in sentence, a defendant must have “been sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 
lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Thus, a reduction 
in sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) is available only if a Guidelines amendment has “the 
effect of lowering the sentencing range actually used at sentencing.”  
Id. 
United States v. 
Thompson, 682 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155) (emphasis 
in original).  Amendment 750, which lowered the base offense levels for certain 
quantities of crack cocaine in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, would not lower Sapp’s base level and 
subsequent sentencing range.  This is so because Sapp’s base level and sentencing range 
were actually based on his career offender status, not on his crack cocaine quantity levels.  
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See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b); Thompson
Sapp is also not eligible for a sentence reduction under 
, 682 F.3d at 287.   
Spears.  The Court in 
Spears concluded “that district courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the 
crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.”  555 
U.S. at 265-66.  However, employing a lower crack-to-powder ratio under Spears would 
have no effect on Sapp’s base offense level or sentencing range, as he was sentenced 
based on the career offender guideline, not via the guidelines based on drug quantity.  
Moreover, even if Sapp qualified for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), he would 
not be entitled to a full-scale resentencing where the court might depart pursuant to 
Spears.  See Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2694 (2010) (emphasizing the 
narrowness of the § 3582(c)(2) proceeding).  Accordingly, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that Sapp could not benefit from Spears.  See 
Thompson
Finally, Sapp argues that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 is unconstitutional because its 
mandatory provisions violate Article III of the United States Constitution by preventing a 
court from exercising its discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  As the Government 
observes, Sapp did not make this argument in the District Court, so our review might be 
limited to plain-error review.  
, 682 F.3d at 288. 
See, e.g., United States v. Vazquez
Sapp takes particular issue with the following section of § 1B1.10: 
, 271 F.3d 93, 99 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (en banc).  But there is no error at all, plain or otherwise.   
In determining whether, and to what extent, a reduction in the 
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defendant's term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) 
and this policy statement is warranted, the court shall 
determine the amended guideline range that would have been 
applicable to the defendant if the amendment(s) to the 
guidelines listed in subsection (c) had been in effect at the 
time the defendant was sentenced. In making such 
determination, the court shall substitute only the amendments 
listed in subsection (c) for the corresponding guideline 
provisions that were applied when the defendant was 
sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application 
decisions unaffected.  
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) (emphasis added).  Sapp contends that the use of “shall” in the 
policy statement prevents a court from exercising the discretion provided to it by 
Congress to reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  We perceive no flouting of 
Congressional intent, however, as the language of § 3582(c)(2) itself explicitly cabins a 
court’s discretion by requiring it to follow the “applicable policy statements” of the 
Sentencing Commission.  Furthermore, to the extent that Sapp’s argument is that 
Congress may not limit a sentencing court’s ability to exercise its own discretion in any 
way and at any point, even long after the original sentence becomes final, he recognizes, 
as he must, that Supreme Court precedent holds otherwise.  See Notice of Appeal, 4-5; 
see also Dillon
  For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
, 130 S. Ct. at 2692 (“proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) do not implicate the 
Sixth Amendment right to have essential facts found by a jury”). 
